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Abstract
Over half of all infant formula sold in the United States is purchased through
the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children
(WIC).  Typically, WIC State agencies obtain substantial discounts in the form
of rebates from infant formula manufacturers for each can of formula purchased
through the program.  The cost to WIC for each can of formula provided
through the program has two components: (1) net wholesale price, which is
equal to the wholesale price of formula minus the amount of the rebate; and (2)
retail markup, which is equal to the retail price minus the wholesale price.  This
analysis suggests that retail markup accounts for most of the cost to WIC of
infant formula in most States.  However, both cost components have increased
over time.  The recent increase in both net wholesale price and retail markup
coincides with the introduction of higher priced supplemented infant formulas.
Conditions may change after the market adjusts to these new formulas.  
Keywords
WIC; Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Chil-
dren; infant formula; rebates; net wholesale price; retail markup; wholesale
price, Food Assistance and Nutrition Research Program, FANRP.
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Summary
What Is the Issue?
Over half of all infant formula sold in the United States is purchased
through the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants,
and Children (WIC). Typically, WIC State agencies obtain significant
discounts in the form of rebates from infant formula manufacturers for each
can of formula purchased through WIC. In exchange, the manufacturer is
given exclusive right to provide its product to WIC participants in the State.
Contracts are awarded to the manufacturer offering the lowest net wholesale
price (manufacturer's wholesale price minus the rebate). 
Infant formula rebates totaled $1.6 billion in fiscal year 2004, an amount
that supported about one-quarter of all WIC participants. Since the estab-
lishment of the rebate program in 1988, rebates as a share of total pre-rebate
WIC food costs increased rapidly, peaking at 33.5 percent in fiscal year
2000. In other words, without the rebates, WIC food costs would have been
one-third higher. However, rebates as a share of WIC’s food costs have
fallen each year since 2000 (down to 31.6 percent in 2004). In recent years,
some States awarding new infant formula rebate contracts have seen a
marked increase in the net wholesale price for formula. Since WIC is a
discretionary program with fixed funding, higher costs mean that fewer
persons will be served (or that additional funds need to be appropriated).  
What Did the Project Find?
The cost that WIC pays for each can of formula provided through the
program has two components: the net wholesale price that goes to the
manufacturer and the retail markup that goes to the retailer. Both these costs
have increased in recent years. 
Prior to 2004, most infant formula rebate contracts were bid on by two
manufacturers, usually Mead Johnson and Ross, with Nestlé bidding on just
more than one-quarter of all contracts.  Nestlé has since joined in bidding
on nearly all contracts, which would seemingly make it less likely that a
manufacturer would win a contract with an unusually low rebate (resulting
in a high net wholesale price to the WIC State agency). However, the real
net wholesale prices bid by all three competitors have increased in recent
years. Of the 16 States that have awarded infant formula rebate contracts
since 2003, 10 (63 percent) saw a net increase in real net wholesale price
relative to their latest pre-2003 contract for powder and 13 (81 percent) saw
an increase relative to their pre-2003 contract for liquid concentrate. 
Some of this recent increase in net wholesale price can be attributed to the
introduction of more costly formulas supplemented with DHA and ARA
(two fatty acids found in breast milk).   Although not all States currently
offer these new formulas to their WIC recipients, recent legislation requires
that all States offer the supplemented formula as of their next rebate
contract, presuming that the manufacturers submit bids based on these
supplemented formulas. 
iii
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During the second quarter of 2004, the retail markup was substantially
greater for the new DHA- and ARA-supplemented infant formulas than for
unsupplemented formulas (retail markups for the new supplemented
formulas were also found to exceed the markup of unsupplemented
formulas from 1994 to 2000, indicating that retail markups to WIC have
increased over time). The effect of the markup that States pay retailers can
be substantial. In many cases, it is the largest component of the cost to WIC.
However, it is because of the effectiveness of the rebate program that net
wholesale prices are so low. If net wholesale prices were to increase to the
level experienced in New York in 2003 (where net wholesale prices of
powder were over three times the retail markup), total costs to States would
increase significantly.  
This analysis suggests that both cost components to WIC—net wholesale
price and retail markup—have increased over time. However, much of the
increase in costs is due to the higher priced DHA- and ARA-supplemented
infant formulas. Because these supplemented formulas are relatively new to
the market (first introduced in 2002), conditions observed in this study may
change once the market reaches long-term equilibrium.
How Was the Project Conducted?
This report examines trends in the factors affecting WIC infant formula
costs from January 1998 to January 2006. The cost that WIC pays for each
can of formula provided through the program after rebate has two compo-
nents: a part that goes to the manufacturer and a part that goes to the
retailer. The part that goes to the manufacturer is the net wholesale price
(wholesale price minus the rebate); this has been the subject of most
previous studies on WIC's infant formula rebate program. Retail markup—
the part that WIC pays to the retailer (retail price minus wholesale price)—
has not received nearly as much attention.  
This study examines the cost of infant formula to the WIC program in light
of recent changes in the infant formula market and in the program's author-
izing legislation.  It is the only study to examine the rebates associated with
infant formula in both liquid concentrate and powdered forms. Powdered
formula has not been the focus of most previous studies, yet it has become
the most prevalent form of formula provided in WIC. Information comes
from several sources—data on infant formula manufacturers' bids for rebate
contracts, formula manufacturers' wholesale price lists, and scanner-based
retail sales data from supermarkets.
iv
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Introduction
The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Chil-
dren (WIC) provides supplemental foods, nutrition education, and health
care referrals to low-income pregnant, postpartum, and breastfeeding
women; infants; and children up to age 5 who are at nutritional risk. Over
half of all infant formula sold in the United States is purchased through
WIC. Federal law requires that WIC State agencies enter into cost-
containment contracts for the purchase of infant formula. Typically, WIC
State agencies obtain substantial discounts in the form of rebates from the
infant formula manufacturers for each can of formula purchased through
WIC.1 In exchange for the rebates, a manufacturer is given the exclusive
right to provide its product to WIC participants in the State. Contracts are
awarded to the manufacturer offering the WIC State agency the lowest net
wholesale price, as determined by the manufacturer’s wholesale price minus
the rebate.2
Infant formula rebates have become an important component of the WIC
program, totaling $1.6 billion in fiscal year 2004, an amount that supports
about one-quarter of all WIC participants.3 The effect of infant formula
rebates on reducing program costs has been significant. Since the establish-
ment of the rebate program in the late 1980s, rebates as a share of total pre-
rebate WIC food costs (i.e., costs before taking into account savings from
the rebates) increased rapidly, peaking at 33.5 percent in fiscal year 2000
(fig. 1). In other words, WIC food costs would have been one-third higher at
the same level of participation without the rebates. However, rebates as a
share of total pre-rebate food costs have fallen each year since 2000 (down
to 31.6 percent in 2004), as total WIC food costs increased faster than
rebates. In recent years, some States awarding new infant formula rebate
contracts have seen a marked increase in the net wholesale price for
formula. This trend, if sustained, could have far-reaching negative implica-
tions for the WIC program. Therefore, understanding the costs to WIC of
infant formula—and the factors behind costs—is important. 
This report examines trends in the factors affecting WIC infant formula
costs during the period January 1998-January 2006. The cost that WIC pays
1
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1Without the rebates, infant formula
would be the most costly food item
provided by WIC. Infant formula
accounted for 44.1 percent of total
WIC food costs before rebates in fiscal
year 2003, but only 17.8 percent after
rebates (FNS, 2006). 
2 The term “net wholesale price” is
equivalent to the term “net price” used
in previous ERS reports of the infant
formula market by Oliveira et al.
(2004) and Prell (2004).
3Estimate of the total value of rebates
was provided by USDA’s Food and
Nutrition Service (FNS).
Infant formula rebates as a share of total pre-rebate WIC food costs, 
fiscal 1988-2004
Source: USDA, Food and Nutrition Service.
Percent
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for each can of formula
provided through the
program after rebate
has two components: a
part that goes to the
manufacturer and a
part that goes to the
retailer (fig. 2). The
part that goes to the
manufacturer is
referred to as the net
wholesale price and is
equal to the wholesale
price minus the rebate.
This is the part of the
total cost to WIC that
is the focus of WIC
rebate bids and subject
of most of the previous
studies on WIC’s infant
formula rebate
program.4 The second
cost component is retail markup, which has not received nearly as much
attention. Retail markup is the part that WIC pays to the retailer (e.g., a
supermarket or grocery store) and is equal to the retail price minus the
wholesale price. Thus, the cost to WIC for each can of formula sold through
the program (after rebate) can be expressed as:5
Cost to WIC = Net Wholesale Price + Retail Markup,
where  
Net Wholesale Price = Wholesale Price–Rebate 
and 
Retail Markup = Retail Price–Wholesale Price
Information from several sources—including data on infant formula manu-
facturers’ bids for rebate contracts, formula manufacturers’ wholesale price
lists, and scanner-based retail sales data from supermarkets—is used to
address two major questions:
1. What are the recent trends in the infant formula rebates in terms of net
wholesale price? 
2. How much does the retail markup for infant formula affect the costs to
WIC State agencies?  
This study examines the cost of infant formula to the WIC program in light
of recent changes in the infant formula market and in the program’s author-
izing legislation.6 It is the only study to examine rebates associated with
infant formula in both liquid concentrate and powdered forms. Powdered
formula has not been the focus of most previous studies, though it has
become the most prevalent form of formula provided in WIC. This is also
the first study to consider the impact of retail markups on costs to the WIC
program.   
2
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4For example, see Government
Accountability Office (2006), General
Accounting Office (2003), and Center
on Budget and Policy Priorities
(1995). 
Relationship of infant formula rebate, net 
wholesale price, and retail markup for can of 
powdered formula
Note:  Example based on a 12.9-oz can of Ross Similac 
with iron (powder) in the California WIC program during the 
2nd quarter of 2004.
Source:  USDA’s Economic Research Service.
Figure 2
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5The cost of formula to WIC can also
be expressed as retail price minus the
manufacturer’s rebate. Although this
may be a simpler way of expressing
infant formula’s costs to WIC, this
report retains the fuller expression in
order to emphasize that costs to WIC
are established by two different market
agents—infant formula manufacturers
and foodstore retailers. 
6 This study focuses solely on the infant
formula provided through the WIC pro-
gram that is covered by cost-contain-
ment contracts with manufacturers. The
Government Accountability Office
(2006) estimates that this includes
about 92 percent of all infant formula
provided through WIC. WIC does not
receive rebates for the remaining 8 per-
cent of infant formula provided to WIC
participants, which includes exempt
infant formula for use by infants with
an unusual medical or dietary problem
and non-exempt infant formula pro-
duced by a manufacturer not covered
by the cost-containment contract. Local
WIC agencies are required to obtain
medical documentation to provide
exempt and noncontract, non-exempt
infant formula to program participants.
Overview of the WIC Program
WIC is based on the premise that early intervention programs during critical
times of growth and development can help prevent future medical and
developmental problems. Administered by USDA’s Food and Nutrition
Service (FNS), the program provides grants for food benefits, nutrition serv-
ices, and administration to 90 WIC State agencies, including the 50 States,
the District of Columbia, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, American Samoa,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands, and 34 Indian tribal organizations. Each State agency is
responsible for program operations within its jurisdictions. 
Since its establishment in the early 1970s, WIC has become one of the
central components of the Nation’s food assistance system. In fiscal year
2005, an average 8 million persons participated in the program each month
(USDA, 2005). This includes over 2 million infants, or almost half of all
infants born in the United States. 
To qualify for WIC, a family’s income must be at or below 185 percent of
the Federal poverty guidelines ($35,798 for a family of four in July 2005).7
Applicants must also be nutritionally at risk, as determined by a health
professional such as a physician, nutritionist, or nurse.8
The authorized foods provided through WIC are high in one or more of five
target nutrients—protein, calcium, iron, and vitamins A and C—identified as
lacking in the diets of the program’s target population, which may result in
adverse health consequences. Participants are prescribed one of seven food
packages according to participant category. The food package for
nonbreastfed infants less than 1 year of age provides up to the monthly
maximum allowance of 403 fluid ounces of liquid concentrate infant
formula, 806 fluid ounces of infant formula in ready-to-feed form, or 8
pounds of powdered infant formula.9 The maximum monthly allowance of
liquid concentrate, the equivalent of 31 13-ounce cans of liquid concentrate,
reconstitutes to 806 fluid ounces. 
To provide program participants with supplemental food packages, States
may use three types of food delivery systems (or any combination of the
three):
• Retail food delivery systems—participants obtain supplemental food free
of charge by transacting a food instrument at authorized retail vendors.
• Home food delivery systems—supplemental foods are delivered to the
participant’s home.
• Direct distribution food delivery systems—participants pick up supple-
mental foods from storage facilities operated by the State or local
agency. 
Most States distribute WIC foods primarily via the retail food delivery
systems. (The exceptions are Vermont and one Indian tribal organization,
which use a home delivery system; and Mississippi and one Indian tribal
organization, which use direct distribution.)  Under the retail food delivery
system, participants purchase the WIC food items from retail foodstores
3
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7Applicants who participate or who
have certain family members who par-
ticipate in the Food Stamp, Medicaid,
or Temporary Assistance Program for
Needy Families (TANF) programs are
deemed to meet the income eligibility
criterion automatically.
8WIC applicants are required to meet
only one of a number of nutritional
risk criteria to be eligible for WIC.
Research has determined “that nearly
all U.S. women and children” meet at
least one of the criteria and are thus
considered to be at nutritional risk
(Institute of Medicine, 2002). 
9Starting at 4 months, the infant pack-
ages also provide infant cereal and
fruit juice.
using a food instrument (i.e., voucher, coupon, or EBT card) that specifies
the types and amounts of foods that can be purchased.10 Only those vendors
(usually supermarkets, grocery stores, or pharmacies) authorized by the
WIC State agency may transact and redeem food instruments. Generally,
retailers submit the instruments to their bank, which submits them to the
WIC State agency’s bank. That bank then pays the vendors the full retail
price (i.e., shelf price) of the WIC food items with funds provided by the
WIC State agency in a manner set forth in the State agency’s contract with
the bank. 
Because WIC is a discretionary grant program funded annually at a level
determined by appropriations law, the number of participants that can be
served depends on the annual congressional appropriations as well as the
cost of operating the program.11 Cost-containment practices thus enable
WIC to increase the number of applicants it can enroll.
4
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10 The food instrument also specifies
the brand of infant formula.
11In the event that WIC does not have
the funds to enroll all eligible appli-
cants, WIC developed a priority sys-
tem to ensure that those at the greatest
nutrition risk receive program benefits.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that, in
recent years, funding has been suffi-
cient to provide benefits to nearly all
eligible persons who applied.
The Infant Formula Market
The infant formula market is highly concentrated: three manufacturers
produce the vast majority of all infant formula sold in the United States.
ERS analysis of scanner-based data on supermarket retail sales during the
second quarter of 2004 (the latest data available at the time of the study)
found that two companies—Mead Johnson and Ross—accounted for 89
percent of the market as determined by volume of sales (fig. 3).12 Nestlé
accounted for another 10 percent of the market. 
5
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12 An analysis of the infant formula
market in 2000 found that supermar-
kets accounted for about 69 percent of
all infant formula sold, mass merchan-
disers 28 percent, and drugstores 3
percent (Oliveira et al., 2004).
Infant Formula Types
For infants who are not breastfed, infant formula may be the sole source of
nutrition during the first months of life. Conventional milk-based infant
formula, containing lactose (a carbohydrate in cow’s milk) and cow-milk
proteins, is the most widely used formula. Soy-based formulas, free of
cow-milk proteins and lactose, are an alternative protein source for infants
with milk-based allergies or with symptoms of lactose intolerance. They
are also used by parents seeking a vegetarian diet for their infants. These
milk- and soy-based formulas are available in three different forms:
• Powder—the least expensive formula, it must be mixed with water
and stirred,
• Liquid concentrate—must be mixed with an equal amount of
water, and 
• Ready-to-feed—the most expensive form of formula, it does not
require mixing. 
Milk- and soy-based formulas are available in a wide range of package
sizes and in two different iron levels: added iron and low iron. The Amer-
ican Academy of Pediatrics recommends that formula-fed infants receive
an iron-fortified formula as a way of reducing the prevalence of iron defi-
ciency anemia (1999). Iron-fortified infant formula is routinely issued in
WIC; all low-iron infant formula issued through WIC requires medical
documentation. Infant formulas supplemented with two fatty acids found in
small concentrations in breast milk—docosahexaenoic acid (DHA) and
arachidonic acid (ARA)—are available to consumers, as are unsupple-
mented forms of formula.  
A wide range of infant formulas in addition to the standard milk- and soy-
based formulas used for routine infant feeding is also available on the
market. Most of these formulas are designed for infants with unique nutri-
tional needs. For example, milk-based lactose-free formulas are available
for infants sensitive to lactose. Hypoallergenic formulas are available for
infants with food protein allergies. Infant formulas are available for
infants with other special nutritional needs (e.g., low-birth-weight and
premature infants) and medical disorders, such as phenylketonuria (PKU).
Milk- and soy-based
formulas accounted for most
of formula sold by volume.
Over three-quarters (77
percent) of all infant formula
sold was milk-based, while
soy-based formula accounted
for 17 percent. Formulas that
use another product base,
primarily protein
hydrolysate, accounted for
the remaining 6 percent of all
formula sold.13  
The use of formula in
powdered form has increased
markedly in recent years.
Between 1994 and 2000,
powder increased from 44
percent to 62 percent of all
formula sold by volume on a
reconstituted basis (Oliveira
et al., 2004). Over the same
period, liquid concentrate
decreased from 42 percent to
27 percent of all formula sold, and ready-to-feed decreased from 14 percent
to 11 percent. Data from the second quarter of 2004 indicate that this trend
is continuing: powder accounted for 70 percent of dollar sales, compared
with 23 percent for liquid concentrate and 7 percent for ready-to-feed.14 
An important development in recent years has been the introduction of
infant formulas supplemented with the fatty acids docosahexaenoic acid
(DHA) and arachidonic acid (ARA). Ross first introduced these formulas
into their product lines in 2002, with Mead Johnson and Nestlé following in
2003. While some studies have suggested that the addition of these fatty
acids to formula may improve visual function and the mental development
of infants, other studies have not found such a relationship. Citing the lack
of data on the fatty acids’ effectiveness, the American Academy of Pedi-
atrics (AAP) Committee on Nutrition has recommended that the Academy
not take an official stand at this time (AAP Committee on Nutrition, 2002).
The share of total sales of infant formula attributed to DHA- and ARA-
supplemented formulas has increased rapidly since their introduction (fig. 4).
By the second quarter of 2004, supplemented formulas accounted for almost
two-thirds (63.6 percent) of total dollar sales of formula in supermarkets. 
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13 Protein hydrolysate formulas make
milk proteins more digestible and less
allergenic and provide alternative
sources of protein to children who are
allergic to milk and soy proteins. 
Share of infant formula sold in U.S. 
supermarkets by manufacturer, 
2nd quarter of 2004
Figure 3
All other  1%
Nestlé 
10%
Ross  39%
Mead Johnson  
50%
Note:  Market share was determined by volume 
of sales based on stores with annual sales over 
$2 million.  “All other” includes store brand infant 
formula where manufacturer was not identified.
Source: ERS analysis of ACNielsen Scantrack 
data.
14 The increased use of powdered for-
mula has been attributed in part to the
increase in breastfeeding. Powdered
formulas “are commonly used to make
up an occasional formula feeding for
breastfed infants and many mothers
may have continued to use powdered
formulas after the cessation of breast-
feeding” (Fomon, 2001).  
Wholesale Price of Infant Formula
This section examines the wholesale prices of infant formula produced by
the three major manufacturers—Mead Johnson, Ross, and Nestlé. Because
both the can sizes and reconstitution factors for formula in powder form
differ across the three manufacturers, all prices were converted to a standard
unit—26 ounces of reconstituted formula. This volume was chosen because
it is the ready-to-feed equivalent of a 13-ounce can of liquid concentrate.
This conversion allows one to easily compare prices for different package
sizes and product forms. All three manufacturers offer liquid concentrate in
13-ounce cans that reconstitute to 26 ounces.  
Figures 5 and 6 show the wholesale price of milk-based powder and liquid
concentrate in nominal terms (i.e., not adjusted for inflation) between
January 1998 and August 2005 for both the new DHA- and ARA-supple-
mented formulas and the unsupplemented formulas.15 During this period,
each manufacturer raised the wholesale price of its unsupplemented formula
(both powder and liquid concentrate) five or six times and the wholesale
price of their supplemented formula once. In general, wholesale prices for
Mead Johnson and Ross unsupplemented formulas were similar, and both
were higher than that of Nestlé. For all three manufacturers, supplemented
formulas were more costly than the unsupplemented formulas, and compa-
rable in price among all three companies. 
While nominal (i.e., not adjusted for inflation) wholesale prices have risen
over time, have they increased faster than inflation?  The answer depends on
two factors: the set of goods used to measure inflation and the reference
period. For example, the Consumer Price Index for all items (CPI-U)—the
most widely used measure of inflation, or general price changes—is a
broad, comprehensive price index that measures the average change over
time in prices paid by urban consumers for a market basket of consumer
goods and services. More specific measures to compare infant formula
prices against inflation include the CPI for food at home and the CPI for
7
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15Wholesale prices represent the man-
ufacturers’ lowest national wholesale
price per unit for a full truckload of
infant formula as reported in each
manufacturer’s price list catalog.
Wholesale prices were obtained from
wholesalers’ price lists through August
2005.
Sales of DHA- and ARA-supplemented formula as a share
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Wholesale prices of milk-based powder by brand, 1998-2005
Figure 5
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Wholesale prices of milk-based liquid concentrate by brand, 1998-2005
Figure 6
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Source: Infant formula manufacturers’ product price list catalogs.
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nonprescription drugs and medical supplies.16 The reference period used
here for price comparisons is January 1998 to August 2005. Results indicate
that the wholesale price of powdered unsupplemented formula by Mead
Johnson, Ross, and Nestlé increased by 24.4 percent, 20.5 percent, and 29.4
percent, respectively, and the corresponding wholesale prices of unsupple-
mented formula in liquid concentrate increased by 26.3 percent, 26.0
percent, and 24.4 percent.17 During the same period, the CPI for all items
increased by 21.5 percent, the CPI for food at home increased by 17.7
percent, and the CPI for nonprescription drugs and medical supplies
increased by 3.3 percent. Thus, during the period January 1998-August
2005, the wholesale price of most unsupplemented formulas increased faster
than overall as well as specific measures of inflation.18 
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17 Supplemented formulas were not
available in 1998. 
18 The period of analysis is important
in calculating rates of inflation.
Manufacturers’ wholesale prices are
unchanged for months at a time, and
determining whether the real whole-
sale price of formula has increased
over a period of time depends on the
length of time covered and whether it
includes one or more increases in
wholesale price. For example, the real
wholesale price of formula will
increase markedly over a relatively
short time period if there was an
increase in the wholesale price during
that period. Conversely, real wholesale
prices will fall if the chosen reference
period is between increases in nominal
wholesale prices, since nominal
wholesale price is fixed during the
period while a price index typically
rises month by month. 
16The argument for using the CPI for
food at home, the Nation’s principal
indicator of changes in retail food
prices, is that most infant formula is
sold in retail foodstores. The argument
for using the CPI for nonprescription
drugs and medical supplies is that
most infant formula is produced by
pharmaceutical companies and all for-
mula must conform to regulatory stan-
dards enforced by the Food and Drug
Administration. 
Infant Formula Products in This Analysis 
During the study period, each of the three manufacturers submitted rebate
bids based on one of two milk-based infant formulas with iron in their
product line, depending on whether or not the formula was supplemented
with DHA and ARA. All analyses of wholesale and retail prices described in
this report are based on these same formulas, shown below:
Powder can size 
as of August 2005*
Unsupplemented formulas:
Mead Johnson—Enfamil 14.3 oz
Ross—Similac 12.9 oz
Nestlé—Good Start Supreme 12 oz
Supplemented formulas:
Mead Johnson—Enfamil LIPIL 12.9 oz
Ross—Similac Advance 12.9 oz 
Nestlé—Good Start Supreme DHA & ARA 12 oz
*The can size of some brands of powdered infant formula changed during the study 
period. All three manufacturers sold liquid concentrate in 13-oz. cans. 
WIC’s Infant Formula 
Rebate Program
In the mid-1980s, infant formula was accounting for an increasing share of
total WIC food costs. Starting in 1987, several States implemented rebate
programs with manufacturers of infant formula in an effort to control costs.
As a result of the cost savings realized from these rebate programs, a
Federal law was passed in 1989 requiring that all WIC State agencies—
except those States with home delivery/direct distribution or Indian State
agencies with 1,000 or fewer participants—enter into cost-containment
contracts for the procurement of infant formula. Current Federal regulations
specify that those WIC State agencies required to operate a cost-contain-
ment system for infant formula must use a sole-source (i.e., single supplier)
competitive system unless an alternative system provides equal or greater
savings.19 Under the sole-source competitive system, a WIC State agency
uses competitive bidding to award a contract to a manufacturer of infant
formula in exchange for a rebate for each can of infant formula issued to
WIC participants. As a result, the brand of infant formula provided by WIC
will vary by State according to which manufacturer holds the contract for
that State. 
How the Contracts Work
Solicitation for bids under the sole-source competitive system can take one
of two forms—single solicitation or separate solicitations. Under single
solicitation, the request for bids is for a single iron-fortified milk-based
infant formula that is suitable for routine issuance to most generally healthy,
full-term infants (only iron-fortified infant formulas are authorized for use
in the WIC program).20 This formula is referred to as the primary contract
brand infant formula, and must be offered in all physical forms—liquid
concentrate, powder, and ready-to-feed. (Although the WIC program usually
issues formula in powdered or liquid concentrate forms, formula may be
issued in ready-to-feed form in special situations, such as when the partici-
pant’s household does not have an adequate and safe water supply or refrig-
eration, or if the person caring for the infant may have difficulty in correctly
diluting concentrated liquid or powdered forms.)  
Manufacturers who submit bids for the WIC contract are required to specify
a rebate amount for the primary contract brand infant formula for each of
the three forms of infant formula. 
The sole-source contract is awarded to the bidder offering the lowest total
monthly net wholesale price, as determined by the submission of sealed
bids, for a standardized amount of the primary contract brand infant formula
by each of the three forms—powder, liquid concentrate, and ready-to-feed.21
Net wholesale price is defined as the difference between the rebate level
offered by the manufacturer and the infant formula manufacturer’s lowest
national wholesale price per unit for a full truckload of infant formula. (All
further references to wholesale price in this report will refer to the whole-
sale price per unit for a full truckload of infant formula.)  The standardized
number of units must contain the equivalent of the total number of ounces
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19See Oliveira et al. (2004) for a sum-
mary of alternative infant formula
cost-containment systems used by
some States prior to this report’s 1998-
2006 study period. 
20 The primary contract brand of for-
mula cannot be an exempt infant for-
mula, which is defined as any formula
that is represented and labeled for use
by an infant who has an inborn error
of metabolism or a low birth weight,
or who otherwise has an unusual med-
ical or dietary problem (exempt infant
formula is not required to have a
rebate). Infant formulas that do not
meet the Federal WIC requirement for
iron may be issued with medical docu-
mentation. 
21WIC State agencies can elect to
award the WIC contract to the bidder
offering the highest monthly rebate if
the weighted average of retail prices
for different brands of infant formula
in the State vary by 5 percent or less.
by physical form needed to provide the maximum allowance to the average
monthly number of infants using each form. 
Because net wholesale prices are weighted by the number of units by form,
it is possible that a manufacturer can bid a relatively high net wholesale
price (i.e., small rebate) on one product form (e.g., liquid concentrate), and
yet win the contract by offering a low net wholesale price (i.e., large rebate)
on another product form (e.g., powder) if that product form receives a suffi-
ciently large weight. 
Table 1 shows how a winning bidder is determined under two different
scenarios. Both scenarios assume an equal number of infants (25,000)
receive formula, two manufacturers bid on the contract, and the wholesale
prices by product form for the two manufacturers are similar. The amount of
the rebate per can offered by each manufacturer by product type also
remains constant over the two scenarios. However, the scenarios differ in the
number of infants issued formula by physical form. Scenario 1 assumes a
nearly equal number of infants are issued powder and liquid concentrate
(13,250 vs. 11,250), while scenario 2 assumes a majority are issued powder
(22,500 vs. 2,000). Both scenarios have the same small issuance of ready-
to-feed formula. The two scenarios can be thought of as two States with an
equal number of infants but different rates of issuance by form. 
Before bidding, manufacturers are given information by the State on the
average number of infants using each physical form, which is derived from
at least 6 months of recent participation and issuance data. Manufacturers
then bid on the rebate per can by physical form. Bids are evaluated by
calculating the net wholesale price per can for each physical form, then
multiplying that number by the standardized number of units, which equals
the total ounces for bid divided by can size. Total ounces for bid are calcu-
lated by multiplying the average infant participation by physical form by the
maximum monthly issuance for each form. The winning manufacturer is the
one with the lowest total monthly net wholesale price after the monthly net
wholesale prices for each physical form are summed.22
Manufacturer 1 bids a high rebate for liquid concentrate—the rebate ($3.70)
is 93 percent of the wholesale price ($4.00)—and a lower rebate for powder
(rebate equals 87 percent of the wholesale price). In contrast, manufacturer
2 bids a high rebate for powder (rebate is 95 percent of the wholesale price)
and a low rebate for liquid concentrate (rebate equals 78 percent of the
wholesale price). In scenario 1, manufacturer 1 wins the contract based on
the lowest total monthly net wholesale price ($305,914 vs. $419,577) driven
by a large rebate for liquid concentrate. In scenario 2, manufacturer 2 wins
the contract driven by a large rebate for powder. In the two scenarios, the
winner is determined by the size of the rebate and the weight they get from
the issuance rates. 
Issuance of formula by physical form varies across States. Although liquid
concentrate was the primary form of formula issued through WIC for many
years, powder is now the primary form of formula issued by most WIC State
agencies.23
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22This is equivalent to the lowest
“weighted” net wholesale price, where
weights are the share of units of each
product form. 
23 A recent study by the U.S.
Government Accountability Office
(2006) found that in the 29 States that
provided information on their use of
the different forms of infant formula,
only a third of all formula issued in
2004 was liquid concentrate, com-
pared with 55 percent of all formula
issued in 2000. 
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All the different types of infant formula (except exempt infant formula)
produced by the contract-winning manufacturer are referred to as contract
brand infant formula. Under single solicitation, the winning bidder is
required to supply and provide rebates for all the different types of contract-
brand infant formula the WIC State agency chooses to issue, such as
lactose-free and soy-based formulas. Contract-winning manufacturers that
do not produce soy-based infant formulas must subcontract with another
manufacturer to supply it. The amount of the rebate on these contract brand
infant formulas is based on the same percentage discount rebate (i.e., the
amount of the rebate as a percentage of the wholesale price) for the partic-
ular form of the primary contract-brand infant formula. For example, if the
rebate offered for the primary contract brand of powdered infant formula
was 85 percent of the manufacturer’s wholesale price, then the rebate for all
other powdered forms of the contract-brand infant formula (including soy-
based powder) would also be 85 percent of their wholesale price. 
The percentage discount rebate is based on wholesale prices at the time of
the bid opening. The contracts contain inflationary provisions. In the event
of an increase (decrease) in the wholesale price after the bid opening, there
is a cent-for-cent increase (decrease) in the rebate amounts. Thus, the net
wholesale price of formula to a WIC State agency remains fixed over the
entire span of the contract despite increases (or decreases) in the wholesale
price.24
Under separate solicitations, bids are issued separately for milk-based and
soy-based infant formulas. Separate solicitations may increase competition
for WIC contracts by allowing new or smaller infant formula manufacturers
with a limited product line to bid on contracts (Federal Register, Vol. 65,
No. 164). 
During most of the 1998-2006 study period, WIC State agencies could
choose to issue all or some of the different types of contract brand infant
formula. Any noncontract brand of formula (including exempt infant
formulas and formulas not manufactured by the WIC contract manufacturer)
may be issued only with medical documentation (provided by a licensed
health care professional authorized to write medical prescriptions under
State law) that an infant has a condition that dictates the formula’s use.25
The WIC agency does not receive rebates from noncontract-brand infant
formula.26
States can either hold an individual contract for infant formula or be part of
a multistate group contract or alliance. Of the 48 States and the District of
Columbia that operated a competitive sole-source rebate system in conjunc-
tion with a retail food delivery system as of August 2005, 30 took part in
one of 5 multistate alliances under which WIC State agencies join together
in a single rebate agreement to obtain infant formula.27 In this way, WIC
State agencies with fewer clients can pool their buying power to leverage
higher rebate levels (Liu, 1991). The remaining 19 States held contracts that
applied solely to their particular State.28
Most WIC participants receive food instruments, such as vouchers, that they
transact for the contract brand of infant formula at authorized retailers. The
WIC State agency then reimburses the vendor for the full retail price of the
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24While the nominal net wholesale
price remains constant over time, the
real (i.e., inflation-adjusted) net
wholesale price will decrease over
time due to general price inflation.
25 The only exception to this rule is
that local WIC agencies may issue
noncontract-brand infant formula with-
out medical documentation in order to
accommodate religious eating patterns
(Federal Register, Vol. 65, No. 164).
26 The U.S. Government Accountability
Office (2006) estimated that noncon-
tract formula accounted for 8 percent
of all formula provided to WIC partici-
pants in 2004. Also see United States
General Accounting Office, 2003, for
information on the use of noncontract
infant formula in WIC.
27 For example, the Western States
Contracting Alliance (WSCA) is com-
prised of Alaska, Arizona, Delaware,
Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Maryland,
Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah,
Washington, the District of Columbia,
West Virginia, and Wyoming (as well as
American Samoa, Guam, Virgin Islands,
and 3 Indian Tribal Organizations). The
New England and Tribal Organization
(NEATO) is comprised of Connecticut,
Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, and 3 Indian Tribal
Organizations.
28 Although Oklahoma, along with 3
Indian Tribal Organizations located
within the State, comprise the
Southwest multistate region, they are
considered an individual State agency
for this report.
infant formula, after which its financial institution bills the formula manu-
facturer for the contracted rebate on each can of formula purchased. As a
result, the cost of infant formula to the WIC State agency per can of infant
formula equals net wholesale price plus the retail markup, which can be
expressed as:
Cost to WIC = (retail price - wholesale price) + (wholesale price - rebate).
Wholesale prices are a component of both retail markup and net wholesale
price. Wholesale prices for infant formula vary by manufacturer; each
manufacturer publishes a wholesale price list for its products. The listed
prices are set at the national level, and vary only by volume, with larger
volume purchases (up to a truckload of formula) receiving a bulk discount.
Since the wholesale price used by WIC is the manufacturer’s lowest national
wholesale price per unit for a full truckload of infant formula, the wholesale
price for an individual manufacturer, used for the determination of its net
wholesale price, does not vary by State (U.S. territories and Indian tribal
organizations are excluded from this discussion). On the other hand, the
amount of the rebate, determined by the contract awarded by submission of
sealed bids, varies by both manufacturer and State. As a result, net whole-
sale price will also vary by State. 
Recent Legislative Developments 
The Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-265),
signed into law in June 2004, made several modifications to WIC’s infant
formula rebate program. Previously, manufacturers could submit a bid for
the rebate contract based on any product in their product line as long as it
was suitable for routine issuance to the majority of generally healthy, full-
term infants. WIC State agencies were responsible for identifying the
specific infant formula products in the winning manufacturer’s product line
to be used in their WIC program. Consequently, the contract formulas
provided to WIC participants in a particular State would not necessarily
include the primary contract-brand product specified in the manufacturer’s
bid. For example, nearly all of the bids submitted by the formula manufac-
turers after February 2003 have been for the new DHA- and ARA-supple-
mented formulas. However, some States have chosen not to offer these
formulas, while others have given the participant (i.e., the infant’s parent)
the choice of either supplemented or unsupplemented formula. Where the
contract formula provided through WIC was different from the primary
contract formula in the bid, the rebate on the formula provided by WIC is
based on the same percentage discount rebate as the primary contract
formula.29 Under the new law, for all contracts based on solicitations issued
after September 2004, State agencies must use the primary contract infant
formula for which the manufacturer submitted its bid (and for which the
contract was awarded) as the first choice of issuance (by physical form),
with all other infant formulas issued as an alternative. As a result, if the
winning bids are based on the DHA- and ARA-supplemented formulas, then
those States awarding rebate contracts will have to offer the supplemented
formulas to their participants if they do not do so currently.  
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29In those States that do not offer the
formula that was bid on as the formula
of first choice, the formula provided
must be on the list of WIC-approved
infant formulas. 
The Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act of 2004 also requires
State agencies or multistate alliances that serve a monthly average of more
than 100,000 infants (during the preceding 12-month period) to use separate
solicitations in soliciting bids from infant formula manufacturers (except
where the Secretary of Agriculture determines that such solicitation proce-
dures are not in the best interest of the program). As of January 1, 2006,
there was one case in which two different manufacturers held infant formula
contracts in a single State—New York, where Mead Johnson held the milk-
based contract and Nestlé held the soy-based contract. However, because the
bids for rebates in the larger States will now be solicited for milk-based and
soy-based infant formula separately, there may be more cases where two
different manufacturers hold contracts—one for milk-based formula and one
for soy-based formula—in the same State or multistate alliance. 
The new law also prohibits the formation of multistate alliances for the
purchase of infant formula if the total number of infants served by the States
exceeds 100,000 (unless the alliance had 100,000 infants as of October
2003). Any alliance in existence as of October 2003 may expand to serve
more than 100,000 infants, but may not expand to include any additional
WIC State agency (an exception is made if the WIC State agency to be
added served fewer than 5,000 infants as of October 2003).30
In recent years, some States have seen a growth in the number of WIC-only
stores (i.e., vendors that derive more than 50 percent of their annual food
sales revenue from WIC food instruments). This growth has been cited as
possibly reducing the savings from infant formula rebates in the future
(Neuberger and Greenstein, 2004). The thinking is that formula manufac-
turers are willing to offer high rebates to win the WIC contract in part
because the WIC contract brand of formula may get more shelf space and
hence lead to increased sales to non-WIC consumers. In contrast, shelf
space in WIC-only stores does not promote sales to non-WIC customers. As
more WIC participants purchase their formula in WIC-only stores, sales of
the contract brand of formula to WIC customers in traditional retail food
stores decrease, and these stores may respond by stocking less of the WIC
contract brand and devoting less shelf space to it. Infant formula manufac-
turers may then lower their rebate bids as a result of the reduced opportunity
to attract non-WIC customers to their products.31
The Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act of 2004 includes several
provisions that attempt to ensure that the vendors authorized to participate
in WIC charge competitive prices. In addition, the Consolidated Appropria-
tions Act, enacted on December 8, 2004, imposed a nationwide moratorium
on authorizing new WIC-only stores, except with USDA approval that the
stores are necessary to ensure participant access. This moratorium was
extended in the FY 2006 Appropriations Act, with an additional exception
for WIC State agencies for which vendor cost-containment systems have
been certified by USDA. In November 2006, FNS published an interim rule
to implement these cost containment provisions (Federal Register, Vol. 70,
No. 228).   
Federal regulations dictate that participants can redeem a maximum of 128
ounces of powered infant formula each month. However, the amount that
participants can actually redeem is determined by can size. If the number of
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30 The same law requires WIC retail
vendors to purchase infant formula
only from licensed wholesalers, dis-
tributors, and retailers set forth on a
list provided by the State agencies.
This is to prevent the sale of stolen
infant formula.
31There were over 1,200 WIC-only
stores in 19 States (including the
District of Columbia) in 2004 (prelim-
inary estimate provided by FNS). In
December 2005, WIC-only stores
accounted for 48 percent of all WIC
voucher redemptions in California, the
State with the largest number of WIC
infants (data from the California WIC
program). 
dry ounces in a can does not evenly divide into 128, participants may be
able to redeem less than the full allotment. For example, if the can size is 16
ounces, then a participant can redeem 8 cans per month and get a full 128
ounces per month. However, if the can size is 14.1 ounces, then a participant
can only redeem 9 cans for a total of 126.9 ounces. This disparity raised
concerns that some manufacturers may have an advantage when bidding for
infant formula contracts because they are essentially bidding on fewer total
cans. Regulations require net wholesale price bids to be evaluated assuming
all 128 ounces of formula are redeemed—no matter the can size (CFR
246.16a). The Child Nutrition and Reauthorization Act allows States—for
contracts awarded on or after October 1, 2004—to round up to the next
whole can of infant formula so participants can redeem the full allotment. 
In July 2005, FNS released a proposed rule that would prohibit WIC State
agencies from requiring infant formula manufacturers, in rebate contracts, to
provide free products and services, such as sample infant formula (Federal
Register, Vol. 70, No. 143). According to FNS, the quantity of sample
infant formula required in rebate contracts has grown in recent years. FNS
expressed concern that the increased quantity of sample infant formula and
other gratis items, including educational supplies, could result in reduced re-
bate savings to individual State agencies and to the WIC program nationally.
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Trends in Bidding for 
Rebate Contracts
This chapter examines the recent bidding history of infant formula manufac-
turers and some of the characteristics of winning bids from January 1998 to
January 2006. The analysis is based on bid data compiled by two different
organizations: the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, and USDA’s Food
and Nutrition Service (FNS), the agency responsible for administering the
WIC program. 
Manufacturers’ Bid History 
During the study period, three manufacturers bid on infant formula rebate
contracts—Mead Johnson, Ross, and Nestlé. Table 2 shows the bid history
of the three firms during this time for the milk-based infant formula rebate
contracts.32 Examination of the data suggests that several changes took
place in the rebate program during or soon after 2003. 
Mead Johnson and Ross bid on the vast majority (94 percent) of contracts
during the study period, while Nestlé was much more selective, bidding on
less than half (27 percent) of all contracts.33 However, Nestlé has been
much more active in recent years, bidding on eight of the nine milk-based
contracts awarded after 2003.34 Furthermore, in the one State that Nestlé did
not bid for the milk-based contract during this period (New York in 2006),
Nestlé bid on and won the soy-based contract. As a result of Nestlé’s
increased bidding activity, all of the contracts awarded after 2003 (except
for New York’s 2006 milk-based contract) have been bid on by all three
manufacturers. 
In terms of winning bids between 1998 and the end of 2003, Mead Johnson
won 18 contracts, Ross 15, and Nestlé 7. However, Mead Johnson has won
only one contract after 2003, while Nestlé has won five, and Ross has won
three.35
During most of the study period (1998 to January 2006), Mead Johnson
won nearly all the infant formula contracts in the large WIC States, and all
the contracts in the multistate alliances. The notable exception was in
August 2003, when Ross won the rebate contract in California that was
previously held by Mead Johnson.36 
Along with the change in contracts won by manufacturers in recent years,
there has been a corresponding shift in each manufacturer’s share of the
WIC market (fig. 7).37 Mead Johnson accounted for 60 to 70 percent of the
WIC market from 1998 to 2003. However, their share dropped to 49 percent
in 2004 due largely to the loss of the California contract to Ross in 2003.
Meanwhile, Ross increased its share from 21 percent in 2003 to 39 percent
in 2004, while Nestlé’s share of the WIC market increased from 5 percent in
2001 to 14 percent in 2005.
Another important change has been in the brands of formula that manufac-
turers are submitting bids for, that is, the designated primary contract-brand
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32Milk-based infant formula accounts
for most of the formula provided by
WIC, so we focus on that here.
33While Nestlé bid on fewer contracts
than the other two formula manufac-
turers, it was more likely to win a con-
tract that it bid on. Nestlé won 58
percent of the contracts it bid on (11
out of 19), compared with 40 percent
(19 out of 47) for both Mead Johnson
and Ross.
34 Four of these eight contracts were in
States in which Nestlé did not bid on
the previous contract.
35Mead Johnson did not hold the pre-
vious contract in any of the eight
States won by Ross and Nestlé after
2003. That is, Mead Johnson did not
lose any of the States that it previously
held contracts in.
36 California is the largest State in
terms of WIC infants, with about 14
percent of the U.S. total (based on
unpublished data from USDA’s Food
and Nutrition Service).
37 Shares are determined by the total
number of WIC infants in the States
held by a particular formula manufac-
turer and therefore do not represent the
shares of total infant formula redemp-
tions. Interstate differences in breast
feeding rates are not considered. Thus,
this chart should be viewed as indica-
tive of general trends in the share of
the WIC infant formula market.  
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Table 2
Bids for milk-based infant formula rebate contracts by manufacturer, 1998-2006
Number
Mead Ross Nestlé of bidders
18991/1/7 YN
28991/1/8 AC
28991/1/8 AG
28991/1/01 OC
38991/1/01 OM
28991/1/01 AP
28991/1/01 OI ,NM ,XT
39991/1/2 LF
29991/1/7 YK
29991/1/7 DN
29991/1/7 NT
29991/1/01 NI
29991/1/01 AL
39991/1/01 JN
29991/1/01 KO
29991/1/01 EN ,DS
20002/7/4 CS
20002/1/01 LA
20002/1/01 CN ,MN ,RA
21002/1/1 IW
21002/1/2 LI
31002/92/6 AV
31002/1/7 YK
21002/1/7 DN
21002/1/01 OTAEN
21002/1/01 ACSW
21002/1/11 IM
01002/02/6 HO
32002/1/2 LF
22002/1/01 AG
22002/1/01 HO
22002/1/01 OI ,NM ,XT
33002/1/1 OC
33002/1/1 KO
33002/1/2 AL
13002/1/7 YN
2ARA&AHDARA&AHD3002/1/8 AC
23002/1/01 CN ,MN ,RA
2ARA&AHDARA&AHD3002/1/01 NI
2ARA&AHDARA&AHD3002/1/01 DS/EN/OM
2ARA&AHDARA&AHD3002/1/01 AP
TN 7/1/2004 DHA&ARA DHA&ARA DHA&ARA 3
3ARA&AHDARA&AHD4002/1/01 LA
LA 10/1/2004 DHA&ARA DHA&ARA DHA&ARA 3
NJ 10/1/2004 DHA&ARA DHA&ARA DHA&ARA 3
SC 4/7/2005 DHA&ARA DHA&ARA DHA&ARA 3
ND 7/1/2005 DHA&ARA DHA&ARA DHA&ARA 3
OK 10/1/2005 DHA&ARA DHA&ARA DHA&ARA 3
WI 1/1/2006 DHA&ARA DHA&ARA DHA&ARA 3
2ARA&AHDARA&AHD6002/1/1 YN
Losing bid
Notes: DHA&ARA=bid based on DHA- and ARA-supplemented formula.
NEATO=New England and Tribal Organizations (CT, ME, MA, NH, and RI).
WSCA=Western States Contracting Alliance (AK, AZ, DE, HI, ID, KS, MD, MT, NV, OR, UT, WA, DC, WV, and WY). 
Legend
Winning bid Did not bid
Source: Compiled by USDA’s Economic 
Research Service based on formula 
manufacturers’ bids.
formula. Beginning with the California contract that became effective in
August 2003, nearly all the submitted bids have been for DHA- and ARA-
supplemented formulas. 
Characteristics of the Winning Bids
The net wholesale price and rebate (per can) of the winning bids (both
powdered and liquid concentrate) are shown in figures 8 and 9. Note that
the net wholesale price plus the rebate equals the wholesale price.38 Differ-
ences in can sizes and reconstitution factors for powdered formula across
both manufacturer and time period make comparison of rebates and net
wholesale prices across contracts difficult. As a result, this discussion
focuses on the winning liquid concentrate contracts (all the liquid concen-
trate contracts awarded during the study period were based on a 13-ounce
can that reconstituted to 26 ounces). However, the same general conclusions
hold for the powdered contracts. 
Rebates varied greatly by State and time period, ranging from $1.82 to
$3.37 per can of liquid concentrate during the study period (fig. 9). Net
wholesale price also varied, ranging from 7 cents to $1.07 per can. The
percentage discount rebates (i.e., the amount of the rebate expressed as a
percentage of the wholesale price) were generally large, ranging from 65
percent in New York (effective July 2003) to 98 percent in South Carolina
(effective April 2000). In other words, the infant formula purchased through
WIC cost the South Carolina program only 2 percent of its wholesale cost,
plus the amount of the retail markup.39
Both supply-side and demand-side characteristics of the infant formula
market help to explain why WIC State agencies receive such large rebates.
On the supply side, the formula market is highly concentrated, a factor
which is often associated with higher profit margins. This, in turn, gives 
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38The wholesale prices shown in fig-
ures 4 and 5 differ across contracts
due to both variation in the wholesale
price by manufacturer and changes in
each manufacturer’s wholesale prices
over time.
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Figure 7
Percent
Ross Mead Johnson Nestlé
Source: USDA’s Economic Research Service.
39Rebate contracts contain inflationary
provisions. In the event of an increase
in the wholesale price after the date of
the bid opening, there is a cent-for-
cent increase in the rebate amounts.
Thus, once the wholesale price
increases (e.g., near the end of the
contract), the cost to an individual
State WIC agency will be an even
smaller percentage of the new whole-
sale price.
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manufacturers the cushion to offer high rebates.40 On the demand side, WIC
participants purchase over half of all infant formula, assuring large sales for
the contract-winning manufacturer. In addition, manufacturers may realize
spillover benefits of winning a WIC contract: retailers may devote more
shelf space to the WIC contract brand, which may spur sales to non-WIC
consumers. Sales may also rise if hospitals and/or physicians recommend
the WIC contract brand to non-WIC mothers.41
Much of the concern about a possible trend toward reduced rebates and
higher net wholesale prices was prompted by the rebate contract for New
York that took effect in July 2003. This contract specified a rebate that was
only 65 percent of its wholesale price (on January 1, 2004, a contract
amendment changed the rebate in New York to 75 percent of its wholesale
price). The percentage discount rebates specified in previous contracts were
usually 90 percent or more (i.e., in 31 out of the 34 previous contracts).
Only one manufacturer—Mead Johnson—bid on the New York contract.
This was seen as particularly significant because New York contains the
third largest number of infants in WIC. States with large numbers of WIC
infants are presumably able to negotiate larger rebates from infant formula
manufacturers, other factors being constant.42 Although no contract awarded
since New York’s has as low a percentage discount rebate, net wholesale
prices in general appear to have risen. 
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40For a fuller discussion of market
power and prices, see Prell, 2004. 
41To win a WIC contract, a manufac-
turer may choose to offer infant for-
mula at low net wholesale prices or
even at a loss in the WIC market by
bidding a high rebate. To be profitable
to a manufacturer, such a below-cost
strategy requires that increased sales in
the non-WIC market offset the loss in
the WIC market. 
42It has been speculated that one factor
behind only one manufacturer bidding
on the New York contract was
California soliciting bids for their con-
tract at about the same time (the
California opening date for bids was
December 2002, versus March 2003
for New York). Concerns regarding
Ross’ capacity to fulfill the WIC con-
tract in two of the largest States may
have prevented it from bidding on both
contracts. 
Trends in Net Wholesale Price 
This chapter analyzes recent trends in the net wholesale price, which along
with the retail markup, determines the cost of infant formula to the WIC
program. The analysis examines the net wholesale prices associated with
both the powder and liquid concentrate forms of milk-based infant formula.
Because both the can sizes and reconstitution factors for powder formula
differ across manufacturers, all prices reported in this chapter were
converted to a standard unit of volume—26 ounces of reconstituted formula.
Net wholesale prices have been adjusted for inflation and represent the price
of 26 reconstituted ounces of infant formula as of January 2006.43
The real net wholesale price for both powder and liquid concentrate has
increased, on average, across those States awarding new infant formula
rebate contracts since 2002 (fig. 10). However, there are several caveats.
Our calculations are based on unweighted data, that is, the net wholesale
prices for all States awarding contracts in a particular year are counted the
same regardless of the size of their WIC infant population. Also, the mix of
States represented in the annual averages varies from year to year.44 Histori-
cally, some State agencies receive lower net wholesale prices than other
States. Therefore, the upward trend in net wholesale prices may arise, in
part, because the contracts in the later years represent high net-wholesale-
price States, whereas the contracts in the early years could represent low
net-wholesale-price States. The next section examines whether net whole-
sale prices are increasing or decreasing for individual State agencies.
State-Specific Changes in Real Net
Wholesale Prices, Wholesale Prices,
and Rebates
Figures 11 and 12 show the difference between a State’s net wholesale price
in its most recent contract (2003 or later) and the net wholesale price in the
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43Specifically, net wholesale prices
discussed in this section have been
deflated by the CPI-U for all items—
the most widely used measure of infla-
tion.
Average real net wholesale prices of newly awarded infant
formula rebate contracts, 1998-2006
Dollars per 26 reconstituted ounces (Jan. 2006 dollars)
Figure 10
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Source: USDA’s Economic Research Service.
44Although infant formula contracts
typically last about 3 years, they vary
in duration across States and can be
longer or shorter. A recent report by
the Government Accountability Office
(2006) found that 45 States allow for
extensions of their infant formula con-
tracts ranging from 1 to 4 years.
State’s prior contract, adjusted for inflation.45 For example, if a State negoti-
ated contracts in 2005 and 2002, the 2002 real net wholesale price was
subtracted from the 2005 real net wholesale price. States are represented
twice in the figures if they awarded more than one contract since 2003.
Of the 19 contracts since 2003, 11 show an increase in the real net whole-
sale price for milk-based powder (fig. 11). Three States—Oklahoma,
Louisiana, and New York—awarded two contracts since 2003. Oklahoma
and Louisiana saw a decrease in real net wholesale price for their contracts
effective in 2003, but an increase in net wholesale price for their more
recent contracts. On the other hand, New York saw an increase in real net
wholesale prices for its contract effective in 2003, while the next contract,
effective in 2006, showed a decrease.46 The net effect of the two contracts
was an increase in real net wholesale price in Oklahoma and Louisiana and
a decrease in real net wholesale price in New York. So, of the 16 States that
awarded contracts since 2003, 10 (63 percent) saw real net wholesale prices
increase relative to their latest pre-2003 contract, and 6 (38 percent) saw net
wholesale prices decrease. 
Of the 19 contracts for liquid concentrate that became effective since 2003,
13 showed an increase in real net wholesale price (fig. 12). The net effect in
all three States that awarded two contracts since 2003 was an increase in
real net wholesale price. So, of the 16 States that awarded contracts since
2003, 13 (81 percent) saw a net increase in real net wholesale price over
their latest pre-2003 contract. 
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46Note that the comparison is based on
real net wholesale price as of the
effective date of the contract
(7/1/2003) and does not reflect the
contract amendment on 1/1/2004 that
reduced the net wholesale price to 25
percent of its wholesale price.
Figure 11
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45The total cost to a WIC State agency
depends on the combined effect of
powder and liquid concentrate costs
based on the State’s issuance of pow-
der vs. concentrate. However, because
data on the ratio of powder and con-
centrate issued by individual States
was not available, data on the changes
in real net costs in this section are pre-
sented for powder and concentrate
separately.
Tables 3 (powder) and 4 (liquid concentrate) show State-specific changes in
real net wholesale prices, real wholesale prices, and real rebates for those
States awarding contracts since 2003. The “change in real net wholesale
price” column contains the data graphed in figures 11 and 12. Data in the
next two columns—“change in real wholesale price” and “change in real
rebate”—provide information on the factors behind changes in real net
wholesale price, i.e., whether the changes in real net wholesale price were
due to a change in the real wholesale price, a change in the real rebate, or
both. 
The tables show that real wholesale prices usually increased between
contracts.47 In many cases, the wholesale price for the latest contract was
based on the more costly DHA- and ARA-supplemented formulas while the
wholesale price for the previous contract was based on the unsupplemented
formula. Therefore, the net wholesale price will increase for those States
that switch from unsupplemented to supplemented formulas if the rebate
remains constant. In the past, each State could choose the formulas it would
offer participants from among all the contract brands of the winning manu-
facturer. However, the Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act of
2004 (P.L. 108-265) requires State agencies to use the primary contract
infant formula product submitted by the manufacturer as the first choice of
issuance for all contracts based on solicitations after September 2004.48
Consequently, with all manufacturers currently submitting bids for the
DHA- and ARA-supplemented formulas, wholesale prices will be higher.   
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47There were very few cases where
real wholesale prices decreased.
Oklahoma (January 2003) shows a
decrease in real wholesale price for
powder and liquid concentrate, but the
difference in price was measured
between two different contract holders
(the more recent contract was held by
Nestlé, while the prior contract was
held by Mead-Johnson, and Nestlé had
lower wholesale and retail prices than
Mead-Johnson and Ross during that
time period). The only other real
wholesale price decrease occurred in
powder for the Arkansas, New
Mexico, and North Carolina alliance
of States (October 2003). This
decrease was very small, and coin-
cided with a change in the can size of
Mead Johnson’s powdered formula.
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Source: USDA’s Economic Research Service based on formula manufacturers’ bids.
48Many States have chosen to offer the
supplemented formulas to their partici-
pants even though they were not re-
quired to do so until their next contract.
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Table 3
Summary of changes in milk-based powder contracts 
awarded after 2002
Change in real:
State agencies Net wholesale price Wholesale price Rebate
January 2006 dollars
OK 1/1/2003 -0.074 -0.501 -0.427
CO 1/1/2003 0.011 0.151 0.140
LA 2/1/2003 -0.025 0.087 0.111
NY 7/1/2003 0.199 0.077 -0.122
CA 8/1/2003 -0.033 0.289 0.322
AR, NM, NC 10/1/2003 0.122 -0.054 -0.176
IN 10/1/2003 0.164 0.292 0.128
MO 10/1/2003 0.259 0.334 0.075
SD, NE 10/1/2003 0.060 0.292 0.232
PA 10/1/2003 -0.397 0.137 0.534
TN 7/1/2004 -0.316 0.315 0.631
AL 10/1/2004 -0.154 0.231 0.385
LA 10/1/2004 0.186 0.185 -0.001
NJ 10/1/2004 0.048 0.773 0.726
SC 4/7/2005 -0.050 0.307 0.357
ND 7/1/2005 0.243 0.725 0.481
OK 10/1/2005 0.203 0.721 0.518
WI 1/1/2006 0.137 0.211 0.074
NY 1/1/2006 -0.355 0.230 0.585
Source: USDA’s Economic Research Service based on formula manufacturers’ bids.
Table 4
Summary of changes in milk-based liquid concentrate 
contracts awarded after 2002
Change in real:
State agencies Net wholesale price Wholesale price Rebate
January 2006 dollars
OK 1/1/2003 -0.196 -0.772 -0.576
CO 1/1/2003 -0.214 0.155 0.369
LA 2/1/2003 -0.077 0.086 0.163
NY 7/1/2003 0.999 0.107 -0.892
CA 8/1/2003 -0.058 0.389 0.447
AR, NM, NC 10/1/2003 0.498 0.337 -0.162
IN 10/1/2003 0.333 0.351 0.017
MO 10/1/2003 0.430 0.394 -0.036
SD, NE 10/1/2003 0.072 0.351 0.279
PA 10/1/2003 -0.086 0.386 0.472
TN 7/1/2004 0.072 0.395 0.324
AL 10/1/2004 0.308 0.392 0.084
LA 10/1/2004 0.308 0.286 -0.022
NJ 10/1/2004 0.059 1.126 1.068
SC 4/7/2005 0.265 0.385 0.120
ND 7/1/2005 0.250 0.998 0.747
OK 10/1/2005 0.386 0.989 0.604
WI 1/1/2006 0.272 0.274 0.003
NY 1/1/2006 -0.421 0.249 0.670
Source: USDA’s Economic Research Service based on formula manufacturers’ bids.
Although wholesale prices usually increased in real terms, so did real
rebates. Looking at powder and liquid concentrate combined, only 9 of the
38 changes in real rebates (24 percent) were negative (tables 3 and 4). In 29
of the 38 total cases (76 percent), both real rebates and real net wholesale
prices increased from one contract to the next. In these cases, the change in
net wholesale price is determined by the increase in the real rebate relative
to the increase in the real wholesale price. For example, New Jersey’s
October 2004 powdered contract saw a 60-cent increase in the rebate
amount per 26 reconstituted ounces, but a 64-cent increase in the wholesale
price. As a result, the net wholesale price increased by 4 cents. In 16 of
these 29 (55 percent) cases, the increase in real wholesale price exceeded
the increase in real rebates, resulting in an increase in the real net wholesale
price. 
Trends in Bids
The discussion so far has focused on net wholesale prices for the “winning”
infant formula manufacturer. Arguably, this is the price most important to
WIC. However, patterns in bidding—losing bids as well as winning bids—
may contain information about trends in the bidding process and the incen-
tives of all manufacturers—not just the contract winner—to participate and
offer bids to obtain a WIC contract. For example, if bids by the “losing”
manufacturer appear less aggressive over time as evidenced by relatively
high net wholesale prices, then winning bidders may adjust their behavior
and offer higher net wholesale prices on future contracts. 
Each manufacturer’s real net wholesale price bids for powder and liquid
concentrate are represented in figures 13-15.49 Real net wholesale prices for
both of Mead Johnson’s product types—powder and liquid concentrate—
generally move together (correlation coefficient equals .91) (fig. 13). In
addition, real net wholesale prices bid by Mead Johnson appear to increase
beginning in 2003, about the time that the bids based on the DHA- and
ARA-supplemented formulas appeared. 
Nestlé’s bids (fig. 14) follow a similar trend—real net wholesale prices for
powder and concentrate move together closely (correlation coefficient
equals .95) and bids in later periods are higher than those for earlier
contracts. (There are fewer data points for real net wholesale price since
Nestlé bid for fewer contracts than the other manufacturers during this
period.)
Real net wholesale price bids for Ross’s powder and liquid concentrate also
move together, but to a lesser degree (correlation coefficient equals 0.74)
(fig. 15). In contrast to Mead Johnson, real net wholesale prices are less for
liquid concentrate than powder for many of Ross’s bids. Prices bid by Ross
trend up slightly for the later contracts, although less strongly than bids by
Mead Johnson and Nestlé. 
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49The time intervals between the data
points in the figures are not equivalent.
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Retail Markup
All States except Mississippi and Vermont use the retail food delivery
system to provide infant formula to eligible infants. Under this system,
participants (i.e., the infants’ caretakers) obtain the formula by transacting a
check or voucher at an authorized retailer. The WIC State agency then reim-
burses the vendor for the full retail price of the formula. Thus, the cost of
the formula to the WIC State agency equals the net wholesale price plus the
retail markup, defined as the difference between the retail and wholesale
price (i.e., the infant formula manufacturer’s lowest national wholesale price
per unit for a full truckload of infant formula).50
The role of retailers is important, as they—not the infant formula manufac-
turers—set the retail price. Although wholesale prices are a major determi-
nant of retail prices, retailers consider additional factors such as the cost of
transporting the formula from the store warehouse to the store, shelf space,
overhead, product movement, profit, and other local supply and demand
factors. Retail markup can vary widely depending on a store’s pricing
strategy. For example, at one extreme, some retailers may use infant formula
as a loss leader, whereby they price the product below cost to attract people
into their store to purchase other items at full markup. 
The information on retail markup presented in this chapter is based on
published national wholesale prices and ERS analysis of ACNielsen Scan-
track retail price data, which are representative of sales in supermarkets with
$2 million or more in annual sales.51 The retail markup by manufacturer
and physical form for both the supplemented and unsupplemented types of
formula during the 2nd quarter of 2004 (April to June), the most recently
available retail data, is shown on a percentage basis in figure 16.52
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50Wholesale prices vary by volume,
with larger volume purchases (up to a
truckload of formula) receiving a bulk
discount. Smaller retail stores that pur-
chase smaller volumes of infant formula
will therefore pay more for formula per
unit than larger stores. Although the
cost to WIC is unaffected, part of the
“retail markup,” as defined in this re-
port, may actually include part of the
wholesale price that smaller retailers
pay to the infant formula manufacturers.
51 The ACNielsen Scantrack data
exclude formula purchased at mass
merchandisers such as Wal-Mart, phar-
macies, and small groceries.
52 The percentage retail markup is the
difference between the retail and
wholesale price as a percentage of the
retail price. The comparisons are prod-
uct specific, that is, they are based on
the same infant formulas and same size
cans as specified by the manufacturers
in their bids for the rebate contracts.
Mead
Johnson
powder
Ross
powder
Nestlé
powder
Mead
Johnson
liquid
concentrate
Ross
liquid
concentrate
Nestlé
liquid
concentrate
Percentage retail markup of infant formula by form and
manufacturer, 2nd quarter of 2004
Percent
Figure 16
Unsupplemented DHA & ARA supplemented
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Source: ERS analysis of ACNielsen Scantrack data.
1The percentage retail markup is the difference between the retail and wholesale price 
as a percentage of the retail price.
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Several patterns in retail markup are apparent, with implications for the
prices that States pay to retailers. First, the percentage retail markup of the
DHA- and ARA-supplemented formula was always greater than the markup
for the unsupplemented formulas. This is likely because supplemented
formula is more expensive than unsupplemented formula and because
purchasers of supplemented formula may be less sensitive to price than
purchasers of unsupplemented formula. The Child Nutrition and WIC Reau-
thorization Act of 2004 requires State agencies to offer the primary contract
infant formula chosen by the manufacturer as the first choice of issuance
(by physical form) to participants. Since all three manufacturers now submit
bids based on the DHA- and ARA-supplemented formulas, it is expected
that these formulas will be offered to all WIC participants in the future.
Higher retail markups for these supplemented formulas will result in higher
costs to WIC State agencies than if they previously provided only unsupple-
mented formulas. 
Second, the percentage retail markups for supplemented formula found in
this study exceed those of unsupplemented formula during 1994-2000 found
in a previous ERS analysis of the retail infant formula market (Oliveira et
al., 2004).53 This suggests that costs to WIC associated with the retail
markup have increased over time. 
Third, formula made by Nestlé, which has increased its share of the WIC
market in recent years (fig. 7), had a higher percentage retail markup than
did the Mead Johnson and Ross brands. Because the wholesale prices of
Nestlé infant formula products during the 2nd quarter of 2004 were lower
than those of the other two manufacturers, retailers could mark them up
more and they would still be priced below the other brands. However,
Nestlé, unlike the other two manufacturers, has raised its wholesale prices
since then (effective in July 2004). The wholesale prices of Nestlé’s DHA-
and ARA-supplemented formulas are now similar to those of the other two
manufacturers.54
Table 5 shows the estimated net wholesale price and retail markup per 26
reconstituted ounces of milk-based powder faced by WIC State agencies
during the 2nd quarter of 2004. The estimates are based on the assumption
that all States offer the DHA- and ARA-supplemented formulas.55 In reality,
because many States were operating under contracts awarded prior to the
introduction of the supplemented formulas, not all States offered the supple-
mented formulas during the second quarter of 2004.56 However, those
States that did not offer the supplemented formulas at that time either now
offer the supplemented formulas or will be required to offer them in their
next contract (as long as the formula manufacturers continue to submit bids
for the rebate contracts based on the supplemented formulas). Average retail
markups by State were estimated based on analysis of supermarket scanner
data.57
The effect of the retail markup on the cost to WIC State agencies can be
significant. In 25 of the 33 States (76 percent) in which retail markups could
be estimated, the retail markup for the supplemented powdered formulas
exceeded the net wholesale price. And in 30 of the 33 States (91 percent),
the retail markup for the supplemented formulas in liquid concentrate
exceeded the net wholesale price (table 6).  
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54 As of August 2005, the wholesale
price for the DHA- and ARA-supple-
mented formulas in liquid concentrate
was the same for all three manufacturers.
53 For example, the average retail per-
centage markup of the milk-based
unsupplemented formulas by manufac-
turer and physical form during 1994-
2000 was less than 7 percent (except
for Nestlé liquid concentrate at 12 per-
cent), while the percentage retail
markup for the supplemented formulas
in the 2nd quarter of 2004 ranged from
10 to nearly 16 percent.
55 For those States whose primary con-
tract brand was not a DHA- and ARA-
supplemented formula, the net whole-
sale price was calculated using the
same percentage discount rebate as the
primary contract brand applied to
wholesale price of the supplemented
formula in effect during the 2nd quarter
of 2004.
56 The Government Accountability
Office (2006) reported that as of mid-
2005, 8 States did not provide supple-
mented formula; 23 States provided
supplemented formula to all partici-
pants, or provided it to all participants
unless unsupplemented formula was
requested; while the remaining States
provided supplemented formula under
certain circumstances such as when a
prescription was provided or when
unsupplemented formula was not avail-
able in retail outlets.
57 Retail markups were estimated only
for those States in which ACNielsen
Scantrack retail price data were avail-
able. The retail prices used to estimate
retail markups are based on an average
of all supermarkets (i.e., WIC-authorized
stores as well as stores not WIC-author-
ized) in a particular State. It was not pos-
sible to determine the actual retail
markup paid by State WIC agencies
since information on retail prices in
WIC-authorized stores was not available.
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Table 5
Estimated net wholesale price and retail markup of powdered formula
in the 2nd quarter of 2004, by State
Date contract Contract Net wholesale Retail markup 
State started holder price per 26 oz per 26 oz
TN 7/1/1999 Ross $0.65 $0.30
NJ 10/1/1999 Nestlé $0.12 $0.36
SC 4/7/2000 Ross $0.33 $0.21
AL 10/1/2000 Ross $0.58 $0.32
WI 1/1/2001 Ross $0.22 $0.32
IL 2/1/2000 Ross $0.18 $0.35
VA 6/29/2001 Nestlé $0.23 $0.32
KY 7/1/2001 Nestlé $0.18 $0.43
ND 7/1/2001 Nestlé $0.48 NA
NEATO (New England and Tribal Organizations)
CT 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.18 $0.30
ME 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.18 NA
MA 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.18 $0.37
NH 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.18 NA
RI 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.18 NA
WSCA (Western States Contracting Alliance)
AK 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.10 NA
AZ 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.10 $0.38
DE 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.10 NA
HI 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.10 NA
ID 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.10 NA
KS 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.10 $0.37
MD 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.10 $0.33
MT 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.10 NA
NV 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.10 NA
OR 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.10 $0.71
UT 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.10 NA
WA 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.10 $0.57
DC 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.10 NA
WY 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.10 NA
MI 11/1/2001 Ross $0.20 $0.30
FL 2/1/2002 Nestlé $0.17 $0.49
GA 10/1/2002 Mead Johnson $0.13 $0.40
OH 10/1/2002 Ross $0.24 $0.35
Southwest/Mountain Plains/Midwest Regions
TX 10/1/2002 Mead Johnson $0.11 $0.33
MN 10/1/2002 Mead Johnson $0.11 $0.41
IA 10/1/2002 Mead Johnson $0.11 $0.45
CO 1/1/2003 Ross $0.25 $0.36
OK 1/1/2003 Nestlé $0.18 $0.60
LA 2/1/2003 Ross $0.22 $0.34
NY 7/1/2003 Mead Johnson $0.83 $0.27
CA 8/1/2003 Ross $0.12 $0.55
Southwest/Southeast Region
AR 10/1/2003 Mead Johnson $0.31 $0.46
NM 10/1/2003 Mead Johnson $0.31 NA
NC 10/1/2003 Mead Johnson $0.31 $0.24
IN 10/1/2003 Mead Johnson $0.45 $0.34
Mountain Plains Region
MO 10/1/2003 Mead Johnson $0.48 $0.48
NE 10/1/2003 Mead Johnson $0.48 $0.33
SD 10/1/2003 Mead Johnson $0.48 NA
PA 10/1/2003 Ross $0.11 $0
Source: USDA’s Economic Research Service based on formula manufacturers’ bids and
ACNielsen Scantrack data.
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Table 6
Estimated net wholesale price and retail markup of liquid concentrate
formula in the 2nd quarter of 2004, by State
Date contract Contract Net wholesale Retail markup
State started holder price per 26 oz per 26 oz
TN 7/1/1999 Ross $0.35 $0.40
NJ 10/1/1999 Nestlé $0.13 $0.46
SC 4/7/2000 Ross $0.07 $0.33
AL 10/1/2000 Ross $0.17 $0.39
WI 1/1/2001 Ross $0.10 $0.66
IL 2/1/2000 Ross $0.08 $0.63
VA 6/29/2001 Nestlé $0.07 $0.38
KY 7/1/2001 Nestlé $0.15 $0.50
ND 7/1/2001 Nestlé $0.53 NA
NEATO (New England and Tribal Organizations)
CT 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.15 $0.38
ME 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.15 NA
MA 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.15 $0.45
NH 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.15 NA
RI 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.15 NA
WSCA (Western States Contracting Alliance)
AK 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.11 NA
AZ 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.11 $0.58
DE 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.11 NA
HI 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.11 NA
ID 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.11 NA
KS 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.11 $0.50
MD 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.11 $0.42
MT 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.11 NA
NV 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.11 NA
OR 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.11 $0.78
UT 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.11 NA
WA 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.11 $0.79
DC 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.11 NA
WY 10/1/2001 Mead Johnson $0.11 NA
MI 11/1/2001 Ross $0.09 $0.38
FL 2/1/2002 Nestlé $0.07 $0.39
GA 10/1/2002 Mead Johnson $0.14 $0.56
OH 10/1/2002 Ross $0.08 $0.44
Southwest/Mountain Plains/Midwest Regions
TX 10/1/2002 Mead Johnson $0.11 $0.55
MN 10/1/2002 Mead Johnson $0.11 $0.27
IA 10/1/2002 Mead Johnson $0.11 $0.47
CO 1/1/2003 Ross $0.08 $0.42
OK 1/1/2003 Nestlé $0.08 $0.65
LA 2/1/2003 Ross $0.08 $0.49
NY 7/1/2003 Mead Johnson $0.89 $0.35
CA 8/1/2003 Ross $0.12 $0.56
Southwest/Southeast Region
AR 10/1/2003 Mead Johnson $0.62 $0.70
NM 10/1/2003 Mead Johnson $0.62 NA
NC 10/1/2003 Mead Johnson $0.62 $0.43
IN 10/1/2003 Mead Johnson $0.55 $0.60
Mountain Plains Region
MO 10/1/2003 Mead Johnson $0.58 $0.64
NE 10/1/2003 Mead Johnson $0.58 $0.44
SD 10/1/2003 Mead Johnson $0.58 NA
PA 10/1/2003 Ross $0.11 $0.34
Source: USDA’s Economic Research Service based on formula manufacturers’ bids and
ACNielsen Scantrack data.
In most States, the retail markup and not the net wholesale price is the
largest component of infant formula costs. Furthermore, this may be an
underestimate of the actual retail markup paid by WIC State agencies. An
earlier analysis of retail infant formula prices found that being the WIC-
designated brand of formula increased the retail price of formula (Oliveira
et al., 2004). Since being the WIC-designated brand presumably would have
less effect on retail prices in stores that do not participate in the program,
estimates of the retail markup used in this analysis (which are based on both
WIC-authorized as well as non WIC-authorized retailers) are probably less
than the actual retail markup paid by WIC State agencies, which is based
solely on the retail markup at WIC-authorized stores. Moreover, the data
used in this analysis are representative of sales in supermarkets with $2
million or more in annual sales, and smaller WIC-authorized stores not
included in the data set are likely to have larger retail markups than are indi-
cated in tables 5 and 6. 
Our analysis indicates that the retail markup makes up most of the infant
formula costs to many WIC State agencies. However, it is unlikely that WIC
vendor management practices can yield the magnitude of savings obtained
through the manufacturers’ rebates, primarily due to the vast number of
participating retailers and the broad range of retailer pricing strategies. 
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Conclusions
The cost that WIC pays for each can of formula provided through the
program has two components: the net wholesale price, which goes to the
manufacturer, and the retail markup, which goes to the retailer. Results from
this study suggest that the costs associated with both of these two compo-
nents have increased in recent years and that the retail markup exceeds the
net wholesale price in most instances. Since WIC is a discretionary program
with a fixed funding level, higher costs mean that fewer persons will be
served, or that additional funds need to be appropriated.
There have been several important changes in bidding for infant formula in
recent years. Prior to 2004, most infant formula rebate contracts were bid on
by two manufacturers, usually Mead Johnson and Ross, with Nestlé bidding
on just more than one-quarter of all contracts.58 However, since 2004,
Nestlé has joined the two other companies in bidding on nearly all
contracts. The entrance of a third active bidder for contracts may make it
less likely that a manufacturer will be able to win a contract with an unusu-
ally low or seemingly out-of-line rebate that would result in a high net
wholesale price to the State. 
While having three companies bidding suggests increased competition for
the contracts, the real net wholesale prices bid by Mead Johnson, Nestlé,
and, to a lesser degree, Ross have increased in recent years. This has
resulted in higher net wholesale prices in contracts awarded by the States,
and therefore higher costs to WIC. Of the 16 States that have awarded infant
formula rebate contracts since 2003, 10 (63 percent) saw a net increase in
real net wholesale price relative to their latest pre-2003 contract for powder
and 13 (81 percent) saw a net increase in real net wholesale price relative to
their latest pre-2003 contract for liquid concentrate.   
Some of this recent increase in net wholesale price can be attributed to the
introduction of formulas supplemented with DHA and ARA. The wholesale
prices of the supplemented formulas exceed those of the unsupplemented
formulas. Thus, if the amount of the rebate is held constant, this will result
in higher net wholesale prices. Although not all States currently offer these
new formulas to their WIC recipients, recent legislation requires that all
States offer them as of their next rebate contract, presuming that the manu-
facturers submit bids based on these supplemented formulas. 
During the second quarter of 2004, the retail markup was substantially
greater for the new DHA- and ARA-supplemented infant formulas than for
unsupplemented formulas (retail markups for the new supplemented
formulas were also found to exceed the markup of unsupplemented
formulas from 1994 to 2000, indicating that retail markups to WIC have
increased over time). This means that WIC State agencies are paying more
for formula (or will be paying more in the future for those States not
currently offering the supplemented formulas to their participants), holding
net wholesale price constant.
In many cases, the retail markup that States pay retailers is the largest
component of the cost to WIC of infant formula. However, it is because of
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58 An exception was the contract for
New York in 2003, with only one bid
submitted. That bid had an unusually
high net wholesale price (i.e., low
rebate).
the effectiveness of the rebate program that net wholesale prices are so low.
If net wholesale prices were to increase to the level experienced in New
York in 2003 (where net wholesale prices of powder were over three times
the retail markup), total costs to States would increase significantly. 
This analysis suggests that both cost components to WIC—net wholesale
price and retail markup—have increased over time. However, much of the
increase in costs is due to the higher priced DHA- and ARA-supplemented
infant formulas. Because these supplemented formulas are relatively new to
the market (first introduced in 2002), the market may still be adjusting to
the new formulas. As a result, the conditions observed in this study may
change once the market reaches long-term equilibrium. 
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